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Abstract 
 
Over the last decade Florida property owners have saved billions of dollars in taxes due to a 1995 
assessment cap initiative which reduced homeowner’s tax burdens. Florida is not alone in passing 
assessment caps, 20 other states have passed similar property tax reductions. Proponents of Florida’s 
initiative said the measure would protect the elderly, many of whom live on fixed incomes in retirement, 
from property tax inflation. This research examines the vertical and horizontal equity effects of 
assessment caps. Using data from a large MSA in Florida, the results provide new evidence on which 
groups of homeowners are more likely to benefit from these types of initiatives.  
 
Keywords: Property Tax Caps, Horizontal & Vertical Inequity, Economic Incidence, Heckman Selection, 
Suits Index 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Property tax assessment reform initiatives have been a continuing part of American politics since 
1978, when California voters passed Proposition 13. California’s Proposition 13 limited the ad 
valorem taxes on all property to a maximum of one percent of their 1975 assessment. This led to a 
surge of states placing similar tax limitation initiatives (assessment caps) on their ballots (University 
of Florida Shimberg Center for Housing Studies, 2007). Massachusetts’ Proposition 2 ½ and 
Florida’s “Save Our Homes” amendment were two major initiatives that followed in 1980 and 1992, 
respectively. Over 20 states1 currently have implemented some type of property tax assessment 
limit (Haverman & Sexton, 2008). Property tax limitations are and continue to be an important issue 
and seem to be most appealing when citizens feel overtaxed and underserved.  
Assessment caps can significantly affect homeowners’ tax burdens. Florida has had a tax 
assessment limit in place since 1995 and in 2006 alone, the property tax cap reduced the taxable 
values in the state by over $400 billion, which amounts to a total tax benefit of approximately $7.4 
billion (Florida DOR, 2007) 2. Although policymakers recognize the size and growing importance of 
assessment caps initiatives, very little is known about who is actually receiving these tax breaks 
and whether they are equitably distributed across different demographic and socioeconomic 
groups3.  
                                                            
1 District of Columbia is included in this count.  
2 This calculation is based on the average Florida millage rate in 2006 which was 18.47 mills.   
3 Indeed, most research has focused on the vertical equity implications of the property taxes (Plummer, 2003).    
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Research on tax equity and fairness most often focuses on vertical equity, which measures 
how tax rates differ across income groups, and whether the taxes are progressive, regressive, or 
proportional. In order to present a more complete picture, our study examines both the vertical and 
horizontal equity effects of assessment caps. Richard Musgrave’s definition of horizontal equity 
states that “people in equal positions should be treated equally” (1959, p. 160). We interpret this to 
mean that households with similar characteristics should bear similar tax burdens. All else equal, 
when households in different age, ethnicity or socioeconomic (SES) classes pay significantly 
different tax amounts, this violates the principle of horizontal equity.  For example, would it be fair if 
the lion’s share of a tax increase was paid by minority, less-educated, senior citizens? For good 
reason, horizontal equity has been used as one important tenet of equity, and in this study, it 
provides a framework for voters and policymakers to better judge the efficacy and fairness of tax 
policy proposals. We believe there should be no distinction between a tax or a tax savings in terms 
of equity: both should face the same equity principles.  Stiglitz (2001) analyzes tax breaks by calling 
them tax expenditures. He emphasizes that anytime Congress or voters pass a tax preference, it is 
equivalent to spending tax dollars (it has exactly the same effect on the government’s budget as an 
equal amount of new spending).    
Using Musgrave’s original definition of horizontal equity, our study provides new evidence 
about whether the billions in property tax savings due to assessment cap limitations in Florida are 
equitably distributed over different socioeconomic or demographic groups.  Policymakers and 
voters debating assessment cap tax policy will benefit from more information about the real world 
consequences of assessment caps.   
The paper is structured as follows. The literature review discusses two veins of research 
related to our topic. The first is the economics literature focusing on property tax incidence, and the 
second is the real estate literature focusing on the equity implications of assessment caps. We 
continue with a discussion of the methodology and data used in our analysis. Finally, we present 
our model results followed by a discussion of our conclusions about the equity consequence of 
assessment tax limitations.  
 
2. Literature on Property Tax Vertical and Horizontal Equity  
 
Vertical equity has been the primary focus of numerous studies in the economics literature 
examining tax incidence. Traditionally, these studies compute a taxpayer’s average tax rate (the 
proportion of income that goes to pay taxes) and then estimate whether average tax rates differ as 
income rises. The average tax rate falls as income increases for a regressive tax, stays constant for 
a proportional tax, and increases for a progressive tax (Stiglitz, 2000). In studies of property tax 
incidence, individual homeowner’s income is frequently not available and so one of two methods is 
generally employed to calculate the average tax rate. One method uses the market value of the 
home as a surrogate measure of the homeowner’s ‘permanent’ income. The second uses 
aggregated current income within a given area, a county, for example. The data obtained from one 
or both of these methods is then used to compute a Suits index which is designed to provide 
information about whether the tax is regressive, proportional, or progressive.  
A Suits Index uses a Lorenz curve to compare the cumulative distribution of the tax burden to 
the cumulative distribution of income. The index takes on values from -1 (perfectly regressive) to +1 
(perfectly progressive) with a value of zero indicating a perfectly proportional tax. The index is a 
broad, aggregate measure that compares the proportion of property tax paid by each decile (10%) 
of households to the proportion of income earned by each decile. 
Numerous studies (Suits, 1977; Phares, 1980; Metcalf, 1994; Plummer, 2003) have used the 
Suits index to measure the vertical equity of property taxes. There has been some debate in the 
literature about whether current or permanent income is a preferred measure for use in calculating 
Suits indexes (Metcalf, 1994). However from a practical standpoint, empirical results suggest that 
the use of permanent versus current income makes little difference in the size of estimated Suits 
indexes. Three studies that use current income (Suits, 1977; Phares, 1980; Metcalf, 1994) show 
that property taxes have no clear pattern of progressivity or regressivity.  The Suits index ranges 
from +0.23 (slightly progressive) to -0.23 (slightly regressive) in these studies. Two articles (Metcalf, 
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1994 and Plummer, 2003) that use permanent income (proxied by current home value), also show 
wide variation with Suits indexes that range from -0.11 to +0.26. Overall, these studies provide no 
clear consensus about whether property taxes are progressive, proportional or regressive. 
In the real estate literature, studies on vertical equity focus on whether average tax rates vary 
across the tax base (property values) due to under or overvaluation during assessment.  These 
studies measure differences in the assessment to sales price ratio across neighborhoods. Several 
studies (McGreal et al., 2007; Allen, 2003; Birch, Sunderman and Smith, 2004; Smith, 2000) find 
that less expensive neighborhoods have higher assessment to sales price ratios (A/S).   This 
implies that property taxes are regressive. There is not a consensus on this point in the literature, 
however. Other studies (Cornia and Slade, 2005; Goolsby, 1997; Sirmans et al., 1995) find little 
evidence of biased assessments or vertical inequities using similar methods. In fact, Cornia and 
Slade (2006) suggest that vertical equity may be improving over time because the International 
Association of Assessing Officers has introduced changes in industry standards that provide 
greater uniformity in assessment practices. Fewer studies focus on the horizontal equity of property 
taxes, and most of these use A/S ratios to measure inequity. Harris (2004) finds that black and 
Latino neighborhoods pay higher property taxes and have higher A/S ratios compared to white 
neighborhoods. In an AARP sponsored survey, Baer (2005) found that seniors (65+ years old) pay 
proportionately more of their current income in property taxes than younger homeowners.   
Other studies of horizontal equity have measured the variation in A/S ratios across similar 
homes. A given jurisdiction is more horizontally equitable when homes are uniformly assessed, i. e. 
there is lower variation in A/S ratios. To measure variation, most research uses the coefficient of 
variation or the variation of A/S ratios around the neighborhood mean. Using this methodology on a 
sample of single family homes in south Florida, Allen and Dare (2002) find higher variation in A/S 
ratios (i.e., more horizontal inequity) for larger homes, older homes and homes in neighborhoods 
with a higher percentage of minorities. However, there is less variation (and so less inequity) in the 
assessment ratios in high income neighborhoods and neighborhoods with more market activity. 
However, Cornia and Slade’s (2006) more recent study finds that the horizontal inequity in property 
assessments may be diminishing due to more uniform assessment standards. 
The popularity of assessment cap referendums has raised concerns that these initiatives tend 
to shift the tax burden to the poor (Moore, 2009). Focusing just on assessment caps, several 
studies use raw data to calculate household level tax savings. There is an emerging consensus in 
the literature (IAAO, 2008; Anderson, 2006; Bowman, 2006; Dye et al., 2006) that assessment caps 
are likely to shift the tax burden away from individuals who own rapidly appreciating homes to 
homeowners whose property has not appreciated as much. This latter group tends to own less 
expensive homes and to have owned their homes for fewer years.   
Moore (2009) used a slightly different methodology to measure assessment cap equity. He 
calculated the variability of the A/S ratio for homes that have assessment caps and for homes that 
have no assessment limits. He found that assessment caps in Florida have significantly increased 
both the vertical and horizontal inequities in the tax structure. A study by Allen and Dare (2009) 
found similar inequities. Using a sample of 17 million homeowners in Florida, the authors regressed 
the market value shielded from taxation due to Save Our Homes’ as a percent of home value 
against the house’s value and found that assessment cap benefits rise with house value. Not 
surprisingly, this effect is magnified over time as households with longer tenure accrue larger and 
larger tax benefits. This means that assessment caps are regressive (i.e., the assessment cap 
provides smaller proportionate tax savings to those whose homes are less valuable) and so they 
make the property tax less progressive. 
Using a methodology similar to the one employed by Allen and Dare (2009), we estimate a 
regression equation using the market value shielded from taxation as a percent of income as the 
dependent variable. There is some debate among economists about whether property tax incidence 
should be measured relative to permanent or current income. Some argue that property tax 
incidence should be measured using permanent income because housing consumption decisions 
(and their accompanying tax burdens) are made over a long- term time horizon. In essence, a 
household’s tax burden should be defined relative to their housing wealth not their ability to pay out 
of current income. Another argument for using permanent income is that using current income in a 
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cross sectional study may bias the results so that property taxes appear more regressive and 
property tax breaks appear more progressive than they actually are in reality4(see Metcalf, 1994).  
On the other hand, proponents of assessment cap tax relief argue that rising property taxes 
are an onerous burden precisely because they must be paid out of current income, i.e., the 
opportunity cost of paying higher property taxes is current consumption not house value (Englund, 
2003). Using this rationale, current income is a more relevant framework for evaluating property tax 
breaks. Although we find the arguments for using current income more compelling, we believe that 
both arguments have merit. Therefore, we estimate two separate regressions, one that uses market 
value shielded from taxation as a percent of permanent income as the dependent variable  (similar 
to Allen and Dare, 2009) and a second that uses market value shielded from taxation as a percent 
of current income as the dependent variable. Results from these regressions will show whether 
high or low income households enjoy a disproportionate share of the tax savings from assessment 
cap initiatives.  
In addition, we add another analytical dimension to our discussion of vertical equity. Following 
the methodologies employed in the economics literature, we begin the analysis of vertical equity by 
reporting a Suits index. The Suits index does not account for household demographic factors but 
provides a well accepted aggregate measure indicating whether assessment cap benefits are 
proportionately higher for some income groups than for others.  
Furthermore, our study extends previous research by including a variety of socioeconomic 
and demographic independent variables to our regression analysis in an effort to shed light on the 
horizontal equity implications of assessment caps. Thus, we are able to provide new information 
about which demographic and socioeconomic groups are likely to garner the bulk of the tax benefits 
received from assessment caps.    
 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
In 1992, Florida voters approved the Save Our Homes (SOH) amendment. The amendment was 
placed on the general election ballot following a campaign led by Save Our Homes, Inc., a Ft. 
Meyers-based group, that collected over 400,000 voter signatures on a petition (University of 
Florida Shimberg Center, 2007)5. The group argued that the property tax limitation would protect 
elderly homeowners who could not keep up with property tax increases due to the rapidly rising 
home value assessments in some locations. The assessment growth limitation first affected 
property valuation on the 1995 tax roll and applied only to owner-occupied (homesteaded) 
properties. The SOH provision limits the annual growth in assessed value of the property to 3% or 
the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, whichever is lower. Additionally, the assessed 
value of the property is never able to exceed the just value. The SOH amendment protects a 
homesteaded property’s taxable value from increasing in years with substantial increases in just or 
market value. This property tax limitation provides an excellent opportunity to examine equity 
issues.  
                                                            
4 Young families tend to have less current income but tend to consume more housing to meet the needs of a 
growing family and as a result pay more in property taxes. Later in the lifecycle, older households reaching the 
peak of their earning potential are likely to downsize into smaller homes resulting in a smaller tax bill. A cross 
sectional analysis with current income in the regression may lead to higher income households paying 
proportionately less property tax out of ‘current’ income; the result is a regressive tax. Using this same rationale 
for an assessment cap, all else equal, a younger, lower income household may earn a larger tax break because 
their larger home appreciates more rapidly than the smaller home of a ‘mature’ high income household. In the 
context of housing consumption over the lifecycle, all else equal, using current income (instead of permanent 
income) should result in the assessment cap benefit being more progressive, i.e, lower income young 
households will earn more tax benefit than higher income older households.  
5 Florida Save Our Homes Amendment was passed by a relatively close vote of 53.6 to 46.4 percent, with 34 
counties supporting the amendment and 33 opposing it. Strong support was found in southern counties and 
counties on the eastern seaboard. Major metropolitan areas and counties with above average household 
incomes also supported the amendment (University of Florida Shimberg Center, 2007).  
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The data set used in this study was obtained from the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). 
The DOR data set is a cross-sectional database that includes a variety of property- and owner-
specific characteristics such as current market value, assessed property value, dates of sales for 
every parcel in Duval County Florida. Property records for all residential owner-occupied single-
family detached residences located in the Jacksonville Metropolitan Statistical Area (Clay, Duval, 
Nassau, St. Johns counties) in the year 2013 were selected for the analysis (233,787 total 
observations).  
 One major limitation of the DOR data set (similar to other property tax data) is the lack of 
information on the taxpayer’s current income. Therefore, for this analysis all property level data is 
aggregated to the census block group level. The block group is the smallest geographic unit of the 
U.S. Census. In cities, the block group is bounded by streets, roads, or creeks and is usually no 
bigger than one city block. However, in more rural areas, the block group is usually a larger area. 
Because our sample is restricted to owner-occupied detached residential units (as opposed to 
condominiums or rental units), the block group data provide a relatively accurate approximation of 
the homeowner’s characteristics. Data from these small homogenous block groups are routinely 
used as independent variables to estimate household characteristics by government and 
businesses undertaking market or policy analysis (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). The 233,787 owner-
occupied single family homes in this study were aggregated into 389 block groups.  Then, each 
block group was linked with the economic and demographic block group level data available from 
the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS) 5 Year Estimates (2009-2015). Therefore, the 
median income in the census block group is used as a proxy for the homeowner’s current income. 
In addition to median income, the ACS includes a variety of other demographic characteristics such 
as age, ethnicity, and educational attainment of household residents. 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis are shown in Table 1. The 
2013 average market/just value of owner-occupied single family homes per block group in the 
sample is $159,843, which is higher than the mean assessed value of $146,278. This implies an 
average difference in market value and assessed value (amount shielded from taxation due to Save 
Our Homes) of a little over $13,000 per household in 20136. For the jurisdictions in our sample, the 
average millage rate is 17.79%, which implies that for each $1,000 of taxable home value, the 
homeowner pays about $17.79. As a result, the average tax savings or benefit due to Florida tax 
assessment limitation is $241 per household, on average. The average block group has 75% of the 
homeowners that are Caucasian, 22% that have children under age 18 living in the home; and 
nearly 89% of the population with at least a high school education. The average median income per 
block group is $58,813. The average market value shielded from taxation as a percentage of 
permanent income is 7% and the average market value shielded from taxation as a percentage of 
current income is almost 24% for the block groups in the sample.  
To understand how tax benefits from assessment caps are distributed across homeowners, 
we employ two methodologies. First, we estimate a Suits Index which is a summary measure of the 
distribution of a tax that is used to evaluate the progressivity of a tax. The Suits Index is measured 
using both permanent income (block group market value) and current income (block group median 
income).   OLS regression analysis is also employed (at the block group level) to estimate the 
impact of different socioeconomic characteristics on the market value shielded from taxation due to 
Save Our Home as a percentage of income (both permanent and current).  
 
4. Vertical Equity Results 
 
Looking first at vertical equity, we use two different methodologies to explore the vertical equity 
implications of assessment caps. Both the Suits index and the regression results provide new 
evidence about whether assessment caps are higher for some income groups than others.     
Tables 2 and 3 show the Suits index calculations along with aggregated income and market 
                                                            
6 This is the average value of the reduction in the assessed value of the property, not the average tax savings.  
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value shielded from taxation due to Save Our Homes for different deciles of block groups within the 
Jacksonville MSA. The results in Table 2 were calculated using permanent income (market/just 
value) and those in Table 3 were calculated using current income as proxied by the census block 
group’s median income. We find surprisingly similar results. Both calculations show that the 
assessment cap tax benefits are just slightly progressive (Suits ≈ -0.08). The lowest decile gets 
slightly more proportional tax benefits than its income share, and the highest decile gets slightly 
less proportional tax benefits than its income share.   
Recognizing that the Suits index is a well established measure of vertical equity, it does, 
however, suffer from two shortcomings. One is that it is an aggregated measure; it really only gives 
us information about groups of homeowners, not individual households. We know the proportion of 
tax benefits received by the ten percent of homeowners with the lowest home values (Table 2) or 
the lowest current incomes (Table 3), but we know nothing about the individual households who 
make up that ten percent. The second problem is that the Suits index does not account for other 
factors that affect tax benefit; it accounts only for income. Using only income potentially ignores 
other important predictors of tax benefits and subjects the analysis to the risk of omitted variable 
bias. Regression analysis is a useful methodology that addresses this concern and provides 
another way of examining the vertical and horizontal equity aspects of assessment cap initiatives. 
The regression results in Table 5 show the relationship between tax benefit incidence (tax 
savings as a percent of income) and income using both permanent income (Column 1) and current 
income (Column 2). After accounting for the holding period (years of tenure in the home), 
education, ethnicity, age and presence of children as other independent variables, we find that 
income is negatively related to tax benefit incidence. Low income households (as measured by 
either current or permanent income) get proportionately more tax savings than high income 
households; thus, assessment caps are progressive. This result is consistent with our results using 
the Suits index, but contrary to the results reported in Dare and Allen (2009). Recall that Dare and 
Allen (2009) found a positive relationship between income and tax benefit as a percent of 
permanent income. The difference between our results and theirs may be due to the fact that Dare 
and Allen (2009) included only permanent income in a regression that may have omitted other 
important predictors. 
 
5. Horizontal Equity Results 
 
Horizontal equity examines whether there are significant differences in the property tax savings of 
different groups of homeowners based on their ethnicities, education levels, ages of household 
heads, family compositions or holding period for the home. Holding income constant, if there are 
differences in the homeowner’s tax savings based on these characteristics, then the principle of 
horizontal equity has been violated. The results of our regression analysis, shown in Table 4, will 
allow us to determine whether the SOH amendment violates this principle. 
The results suggest that the billions in tax savings resulting from SOH are not uniformly 
distributed across demographic groups. One of those demographic groups is delineated by 
educational attainment. In most cases, households with higher levels of education receive higher 
tax benefits as a percent of current income than those with the lowest level of educational 
attainment. More highly educated homeowners probably live in higher priced and more quickly 
appreciating properties that accumulate more tax savings. The opposite would be true for 
households with the lowest levels of education. However, the negative coefficient on the variable 
denoting college graduates in the permanent income regression conflicts with this story. This 
coefficient suggests that college graduates get fewer benefits as a percent of house value than 
households with the least educational attainment. We find in Table 4 that college graduates were 
more likely to sell their homes in 2007. If they are more mobile, then this could explain the fact that 
their benefits are lower relative to their home’s value since they are more likely to have recently 
purchased a home. 
Our results also suggest that the SOH tax savings are not distributed equally across ethnic 
groups. We find that blacks receive proportionately less tax relief than do whites, and this is true 
whether we measure their savings as a proportion of permanent or current income. Statistically 
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speaking, research suggests that minorities tend to live in lower priced neighborhoods with lower 
levels of home price appreciation, which could explain why our study finds that blacks suffer an 
unequal distribution of property tax savings.   
Results in Table 4 show that Hispanics and other ethnic groups were as mobile as whites in 
2007, and the results in Table 5, Column 1 indicate that the tax benefits of both groups relative to 
their permanent income (the home’s value) is not significantly different from that of whites. 
However, Column 2 of Table 5 shows that Hispanics get about 1.6 percent more tax savings 
relative to their current incomes than whites, while the other ethnic group gets 1.5 percent less tax 
savings relative to their current incomes than whites. It is hard to explain why these differences 
exist, but our study suggests that one real world consequence of the assessment caps is that 
Hispanic and other ethnic group homeowners get significantly different SOH tax benefits as a 
percent of their current incomes than white homeowners. Furthermore, the difference between the 
tax savings received by Hispanic and other ethnic group homeowners is especially significant, 
amounting to over 3% of their current incomes.   
Family composition is the basis of another demographic group that receives different amounts 
of tax savings from assessment caps. Results show that neighborhoods that have more children 
living at home receive higher tax savings as a percent of current income than neighborhoods with 
fewer children. Young families may have low current income, but with easy credit (as was typical in 
2007), they could afford more expensive homes. Tax assessment limits reward these consumption 
preferences resulting in young families getting more tax savings as a percent of current income. 
However, this is not the case with respect to permanent income. The results suggest that 
households with children get about the same amount of tax savings as a percent of permanent 
income (home value) as others.  
 Over the household lifecycle, seniors tend to downsize and live in smaller, less expensive 
homes. Therefore, we expect that seniors may earn smaller tax savings as a percent of their 
current incomes (due to lower home price appreciation) than non-seniors. The results of our models 
bear out this expectation. Seniors have lower tax savings as a percent of current income due to a 
more modest housing consumption preference or because they have higher current income, all else 
equal. Interestingly, seniors have higher tax benefits as a percent of permanent income (home 
value), though. To help explain this, we look at Table 4, which shows that seniors were more likely 
to stay in their homes in 2007. If seniors are less mobile, then they will accumulate more tax 
savings in their homes, all else equal.    
The final source of horizontal inequity that we examine is the length of time that the 
homeowners have lived in their homes, i.e., the holding period. Not surprisingly, the longer the 
holding period, the higher the assessment cap tax benefit as a percent of permanent income 
(Column 1, Table 5). What is somewhat surprising, however, is that the opposite result obtains in 
the regression run with current income. The results suggest that households holding their homes for 
a longer time period have a lower tax benefit as a percent of current income. To help explain this, 
recall that the dependent variable is tax savings divided by current income. There can be no doubt 
that the absolute tax savings (the numerator) has increased over any holding period due to 
appreciating housing prices before 2007. Thus, the negative coefficient indicates that because high 
income owners have longer holding periods, tax savings as a percent of income declines with 
holding period. We have some evidence of this from the probit model shown in Table 4.  The results 
show that high income households were less likely to sell in 2007; if this is true in all years, then 
indeed, high (low) income households have longer (shorter) holding periods.   
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Over 20 states have implemented assessment tax limitations and six more have similar measures 
on the 2010 ballot. In Florida alone, assessment caps grant billions in tax relief to qualifying 
households. Although voters, policy makers and researchers recognize the importance of 
assessment cap initiatives, very little is known about who is actually receiving these tax breaks and 
whether these tax savings are equitably distributed. Evaluations of horizontal and vertical equity 
provide an important framework for stakeholders to better judge the efficacy and fairness of 
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assessment caps on the distribution of property taxes.  
Using a selection bias corrected regression that includes a variety of household demographic 
variables and both current and permanent income measures, we find that assessment cap tax 
savings make the property tax more progressive. As a percentage of income, low income 
households receive proportionately larger tax savings from the caps than high income households. 
This is quite different from previous studies that found that high income households have larger 
homes that benefit from greater appreciation rates and greater tax savings.  
However, when demographic variables that determine socioeconomic status are included in 
the analysis of the SOH assessment cap, a different, more subtle picture of tax equity emerges.  
The results suggest that assessment caps increase the property tax burdens of neighborhoods with 
a high proportion of black households and households with low levels of educational attainment. In 
terms of their current incomes, Hispanics and households with children receive proportionately 
higher SOH tax benefits than other groups. Senior citizens receive proportionately lower tax 
savings as a percent of their current incomes but proportionately higher benefits relative to their 
home’s value. This runs contrary to the logic that supported passage of the original amendment: 
senior citizens on a fixed income were suppose to be a key beneficiary of this policy change.  
Thus, the equity implications of assessment caps are different depending upon whether one is 
considering vertical or horizontal equity. From the standpoint of vertical equity, assessment caps 
improve fairness by making the tax more progressive. However, the horizontal equity implications 
are more complex. The SOH tax savings as a proportion of income are different for different 
demographic and socioeconomic groups, and these differences generally favor the more 
advantaged groups in society – homeowners who are white and well-educated.  Therefore, it is 
important to consider both horizontal and vertical equity to get the full picture of the incidence of 
property tax assessment caps. 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions & Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
Name Definition Mean 
Std. 
Deviati
on 
 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Just Value 
(JV1000) 
Just/market value of owner-occupied single family homes in 
1000s of dollars per block group 159.843 117.839 20.532 909.158 
Assessed 
Value 
(AV1000) 
Assessed value of owner-occupied single family homes in 1000s 
of dollars per block group 146.280 103.765 20.071 863.960 
Assessment 
Cap 
(SOH1000) 
Market value shielded from taxation due to Save Our Homes in 
1000s of dollars per block group. 13.565 19.422 0 160.770 
Median 
Income 
(INC1000) 
Median income in 1000s of dollars per block group. 58.813 26.856 11.232 190.625 
WHITE % of block group population that is White 74.77 25.83 0.08 100 
AFRICAN 
AMERICAN % of block group population that is African American 18.52 25.27 0 99.18 
HISPANIC % of block group population that is Hispanic 6.39 7.18 0 37.21 
ASIAN % of the block group population that is Asian 2.79 4.99 0 45.79 
OTHER % of block group population that is Other Race 3.93 4.63 0 29.34 
U18 % of block group households with children under 18 22.38 8.68 0 57.51 
O65 % of block group households with head of household age 65 and up. 14.47 9.76 0 61.30 
LESSHS % of block group population that is over 25 with less than 12 yrs of education 11.57 9.41 0 0.7109 
HS % of block group population that is over 25 with a high school diploma 29.02 11.81 0 0.8245 
SOMECOLLE
GE 
% of block group population that is over 25 with a college 
education 32.58 9.43 6.478 59.45 
COLLEGE % of block group population that is over 25 with a bachelor’s degree or higher 26.83 17.98 0 80.16 
SOH%PERMI
NC 
Market value shielded from taxation as a percentage of 
permanent income/just value per block group (%) 7.01 6.05 0 32.96 
SOH%CURRI
NC 
Market value shielded from taxation as a percentage of current 
income/median income per block group (%) 23.52 33.04 0 314.90 
Number of Observations = 389 Block Groups     
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Table 2: Suits Index for the ‘Save Our Homes’ Shielded Market Value by Permanent Income  
 
Percentile of Block Groups Ranked by 
Permanent Income (Just/Market Value)
Percent of SOH 
Shielded Market Value
Percent of Permanent Income 
(Just/Market Value) 
1st 10% 0.69% 0.78% 
2nd 10% 1.49% 1.96% 
3rd 10% 2.55% 3.41% 
4th  10% 3.86% 5.14% 
5th 10% 5.50% 7.07% 
6th  10% 7.13% 9.26% 
7th  10% 10.16% 11.88% 
8th  10% 14.68% 15.15% 
9th  10% 20.75% 19.25% 
10th  10% 33.19% 26.10% 
SUITS INDEX     =      0.0611 
(slightly progressive) 
 
Table 3: Suits Index for the ‘Save Our Homes’ Shielded Market Value by Current Income  
 
Percentile of Block Groups Ranked 
by Current Income (Median Income)
Percent of SOH Shielded 
Market Value 
Percent of Current Income 
(Median Income) 
1st 10% 1.15% 0.88% 
2nd 10% 2.46% 2.19% 
3rd 10% 4.15% 3.77% 
4th  10% 5.79% 5.62% 
5th 10% 8.05% 7.67% 
6th  10% 10.16% 9.96% 
7th  10% 12.58% 12.48% 
8th  10% 14.66% 15.33% 
9th  10% 18.12% 18.80% 
10th  10% 22.88% 23.30% 
SUITS INDEX    =     - 0.08797 
(slightly regressive) 
 
Table 4: OLS Results of SOH Benefit (Market Value Shielded from Taxation) as a Percentage of 
Permanent & Current Income 
 
 
 
Market Value Shielded as a 
Percentage of Permanent 
Income 
Market Value Shielded 
as a Percentage of 
Permanent Income 
Market Value Shielded 
as a Percentage of 
Current Income 
Market Value Shielded 
as a Percentage of 
Current Income 
Just Value (1000s $) 0.0176*** n/a n/a n/a 
 (4.70)    
JV100K to 200K n/a 1.738* n/a n/a 
  (2.11)   
JV200K to 300K n/a 6.366*** n/a n/a 
  (5.20)   
JV300K to 400K n/a 9.917*** n/a n/a 
  (6.07)   
JV over 400K n/a 6.670** n/a n/a 
  (3.24)   
Income (1000s $) n/a n/a -0.514*** n/a 
   (-6.05)  
INC25K to 50K n/a n/a n/a -20.27** 
    (-2.78) 
INC50K to 75K n/a n/a n/a -33.89*** 
    (-4.15) 
INC75K to 100K n/a n/a n/a -46.20*** 
    (-4.97) 
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INC over 100K n/a n/a n/a -54.17*** 
    (-5.22) 
High School -0.155** -0.134* -0.339 -0.238 
 (-2.80) (-2.49) (-1.17) (-0.79) 
Some College -0.156*** -0.148*** -0.459 -0.334 
 (-3.51) (-3.43) (-1.93) (-1.31) 
College Degree -0.124** -0.144*** 0.551* 0.560* 
 (-2.96) (-3.51) (2.42) (2.42) 
African American 0.00459 0.00728 -0.171* -0.208* 
 (0.31) (0.47) (-2.15) (-2.50) 
Hispanic -0.0992* -0.0850 -0.358 -0.317 
 (-2.16) (-1.90) (-1.48) (-1.31) 
Asian -0.140* -0.135* -0.602 -0.609 
 (-2.31) (-2.28) (-1.89) (-1.89) 
Other Ethnicity 0.0544 0.0583 -0.0816 -0.0527 
 (0.77) (0.84) (-0.22) (-0.14) 
Kids under 18 in HH -0.180*** -0.150*** -0.781*** -0.812*** 
 (-4.30) (-3.66) (-3.53) (-3.66) 
65 yrs + -0.0628 -0.0301 -0.111 -0.0533 
 (-1.61) (-0.78) (-0.55) (-0.26) 
Constant 22.80*** 21.36*** 87.38*** 80.64*** 
 (5.07) (4.81) (3.71) (3.41) 
     
Observations 389 389 389 389 
R-squared (Adj) 0.1699 0.2151 0.2377 0.2334 
 
County dummy variables were also included in the models but they were not statistically significant 
and have therefore been omitted from this table to simplify the display of results; Standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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